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A B ST R ACT 
SACM (Structured Assurance Case Metamodel) is a standard for assurance case specification and exchange. It consists of an argumentation metamodel and an evidence 
metamodel for justifying that a system satisfies certain requirements. For assurance of safety critical systems, SACM can be used to manage safety evidence and to 
specify safety cases. The standard is a promising initiative towards harmonizing and improving system assurance practices, but its suitability for safety evidence 
management needs to be further studied. To this end, this paper studies how SACM 1.1 supports this activity according to requirements from industry and from prior 
work. We have analysed the notion of evidence in SACM, its evidence lifecycle, the classes and associations of the evidence metamodel, and the link of this metamodel 
with the argumentation one. As a result, we have identified several improvement opportunities and extension possibilities in SACM. The notions of evidence and 
evidence assertion should be clarified, the overlaps between metamodel elements should be reduced, and a wider support to the lifecycle of the artefacts used as safety 
evidence could be provided. Addressing these aspects will allow SACM to better fit safety evidence management needs and practices, especially beyond the scope of a 
safety case. The results and the conclusions drawn are especially valuable for practitioners interested in SACM adoption and vendors interested in developing tool 
support for SACM based safety evidence management. 
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1. Introduction 
SACM (Structured Assurance Case Metamodel; [1)) is an OMG 
(Object Management Group) standard that provides a common frame 
work for assurance case development and information exchange. 
According to the SACM document [1), the standard has been created 
as a response to: (1) our growing reliance on systems whose depend 
ability is critical for a wide variety of applications (transport, health 
care, energy, communications, banking, manufacturing, etc.); (2) the 
need for developing confidence in the quality of these systems; (3) the 
requirement of effectively justifying how dependability has been 
addressed and thus why we can rely on the systems, and; (4) the need 
for making system assurance more practical by enabling the automa 
tion of assurance related information management, and the mean 
ingful representation and exchange of this information. 
SACM defines 'assurance case' as a collection of auditable claims, 
arguments, and evidence created to support the contention that a 
defined system or service will satisfy certain requirements (e.g., safety 
and security requirements). Therefore, assurance cases are the basis for 
developing confidence in the quality of a system. In a structured 
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argument, the relationship between the asserted claims and from the 
evidence to the claims is explicitly represented. 
An assurance case could be targeted at, for instance, justifying that 
a system's timing constraints are satisfied (i .e., justifying why this claim 
is considered to be true). To this end, an argument on system 
verification and validation could be developed, e.g. because system 
stress testing has been performed and no system task deadline has 
been missed during system validation. Testing results and a testing 
verification report could be used as evidence. Assurance case manage 
ment with SACM further aims to facilitate information exchange 
between the stakeholders of a system's lifecycle (system developer, 
component suppliers, regulators, operators, etc.) by explaining require 
ments satisfaction in a clear and defendable way. 
The work related to SACM started in 2008, initial versions were 
published in 2010, and the approved 1.1 version has been publicly 
released in J uly 2015. The standard is divided into two main parts: the 
Argumentation Metamodel and the Evidence Metamodel. These meta 
models were initially created independently and later combined to 
form SACM because they are complementary. Both research institu 
tions (e.g., University of York) and companies (e.g., Adelard and 
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Lockheed Martin) with wide experience in system assurance have 
contributed to the specification. The standard bas been reviewed and 
approved, and is supported, by over 30 organizations, including Fujitsu, 
IBM, No Magic, PfC (formerly Atego), Rolls Royce, Sparx Systems, 
Thales, and Toyota. SACM is further aligned with GSN (Goal 
Structuring Notation; Fig. l(a)) and CAE (Claims, Argnrnents and 
Evidence; Fig. l(b)), two common techniques for assurance case 
specification in industry. A mapping between the elements of these 
techniques and SACM bas been specified (1), and GSN and CAE 
diagrams can be represented with SACM concepts. Therefore, the 
standard covers assurance case constructs used in practice. SACM is 
used in practice both as a data exchange format (e.g. (2)) and as a data 
model for assurance information structuring (e.g. (3)). 
Assurance cases and thus the notions of argumentation and 
assurance evidence have been used for decades in many application 
domains such as nuclear energy and railway. Their importance is also 
growing as a result of their recent introduction in domains such as 
automotive and healthcare (4). An example of system assurance is 
safety certification, which can be roughly defined as a formal assurance 
by a third party (e.g., a certification authority) that a system fulfil~ its 
safety requirements and thus that the system does not pose undue risks 
to people, property, or the environment (5). This formal assurance is 
typically based on the compliance with safety standards, such as IEC 
61508 for electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic systems in 
a wide range of industries, DO l 78C for avionics, the CENELEC 
standards for railway (e.g., EN 50128), and ISO 26262 for the 
automotive sector (6). Demonstration of compliance with a specific 
standard involves gathering and providing convincing safety evidence: 
artefacts that contribute to developing confidence in the safe operation 
of a system and that can be used to show the fulfilment of the criteria of 
a safety standard. Examples of artefact types that can be used as safety 
evidence include safety analysis results, system specifications ( e.g., 
requirements specifications), testing results, reviews, and source code 
(6). For safety, an assurance case is usually referred to as safety case (5). 
Safety evidence management can be divided into several general 
activities (6,7). A company that develops safety critical products needs 
to decide upon the safety evidence to provide for a given system, collect 
the evidence, specify relationships in the body of evidence (Le., between 
the artefacts used as evidence) and with other pieces of information 
(e.g., with an argument or a claim), assess the evidence, and perform 
evidence change impact analysis when necessary. Impact analysis can 
lead to the identification of issues that need to be addressed. For 
example, a piece of evidence can become invalid. Although focused on 
assurance cases, SACM provides concepts and relationships for 
modelling and thus dealing with safety evidence in general. SACM 
represents a promising initiative towards defining common, 
industrially agreed system assurance practices and irnprov ing them, 
including safety evidence management. 
Safety evidence management can be very complex in industry. 
Practitioners can find difficulties in determining the information that 
has to be provided as evidence, in assessing the confidence in the 
evidence, in providing safety argnrnents, and in creating safety cases, 
among other issues (6,7). Furthermore, inadequate safety evidence 
management can lead to certification risks (8). These risks correspond 
to: (1) the risk of not being able to create a system that can be deemed 
safe; (2) the risk of not being able to provide a compelling safety case 
even though a system can be deemed safe, and; (3) the risk that a 
specific assessor or regulator will reject ~ safety ~e even though Jt !s 
compelling to a general safety engmeenng audience. Therefore, 1t 1S 
crucial that a company uses adequate means for safety evidence 
management. Although SACM could be part of these means, it is 
currently very difficult to objectively state SACM suitability for safety 
evidence management because no study bas analysed it in depth yet (9). 
Providing a process for safety evidence management is out of the scope 
of SACM, but the classes and associations that the standard provides 
should allow a user to adequately specify the characteristics of the 
artefacts that are used as safety evidence, how they have evolved, and 
bow they have been handled for a given assurance project. 
This paper aims to determine how SACM 1.1 (hereafter referred to 
only as SACM for simplicity) supports safety evidence management We 
have analysed the notion of evidence that SACM implies, the evidence 
lifecycle that it proposes, the 18 different class diagrams and over 100 
classes of which the Evidence Metamodel consists, and the 
Argumentation Metamodel from a safety evidence management based 
perspective. 
The analysis has been performed mainly from insights gained in 
OPENCOSS (http://www.opencoss projecteu/), a European industry 
academia project on safety certification for the automoti~e, avion!c5, 
and railway application domains. The OPENCOSS consortium conststs 
of four research partners and 13 industry partners including system 
manufacturers, component suppliers, consultancy companies, safety 
assessors, certification authorities, and tool vendors. The project is also 
for assurance of various properties (e.g., safety and security), and the
provision of more details about SACM relationships with other
assurance approaches.
Some publications on safety evidence management have discussed
SACM support for this activity and highlighted aspects that should be
clariﬁed. We have reported on our experience trying to adopt and adapt
an earlier version of SACM for deﬁning a safety certiﬁcation metamodel
[22]. We identiﬁed possible redundant classes in the evidence meta
model, possible overlaps between the classes, and implementation
decisions that might have been included. As presented in detail in
Section 3, these kinds of issues remain in SACM 1.1. We also
recommended carefully analysing SACM before deciding to use it as
basis for another metamodel, and indicated that the notion of evidence
in SACM might be unclear. Other publications have indicated the
potential relationship of SACM with their proposals for safety evidence
lifecycle [23], for characterising safety evidence assessment [24], and
for characterising safety evidence in general [25,26]. Nair et al. [5]
indicate that SACM does not provide a thorough and suﬃciently
detailed analysis of the possible evidence types to provide for safety
certiﬁcation and of how to structure and assess evidence. Li et al. [27]
consider that SACM lacks support for the evidence collection process.
As positive aspects, it has been acknowledged that SACM provides
many attributes for describing evidence [28] and rich support for the
speciﬁcation of evidence provenance [29].
Although these publications have provided valuable insights into
SACM, their analyses have been partial. To the best of our knowledge,
no publication up to now has studied in depth how safety evidence
management can be addressed with all the classes and associations of
SACM.
Regarding prior work on safety evidence management, recent
publications have presented large studies on the state of the art [5]
and on the state of the practice [6,7]. It is also easy to ﬁnd deliverables
in research projects that have reviewed the literature and industrial
practices (e.g., [26]). Prior work has proposed non standard models for
managing safety evidence [19]. Some are generic (e.g., [20]) and others
have been created for safety evidence management according to
speciﬁc safety standards, e.g. IEC 61508 [30].
Finally, there exist other standardization eﬀorts for assurance cases
in addition to SACM. There is a GSN community standard [31], the
Open Group has developed the Dependability through Assuredness
Framework [32], IEC 15026 2 [33] deﬁnes assurance case concepts,
and IEC 62741 addresses dependability case management [34]. Several
domain speciﬁc system assurance standards (e.g., ISO 26262 in
automotive) also provide indications about the intent and expected
content of an assurance case [4], mainly for safety critical systems.
Nonetheless, SACM is currently the only standard metamodel for
creating and exchanging structured assurance cases. Other metamodels
for assurance cases can also be found in the literature (e.g., [35]), but
they are not standards and have been developed by a lower number of
parties.
3. SACM support for safety evidence management
This section analyses how SACM supports the management of
safety evidence (safety analysis results, system speciﬁcations, testing
results, etc.), focusing on the identiﬁcation of possible issues that could
hinder this activity. As explained in the introduction, the analysis is
based on requirements for safety evidence management from industry
and from prior work, and on modelling and model quality principles.
We use the hazard log and software veriﬁcation results as main running
examples for presenting the analysis. A hazard log can be deﬁned as the
document in which all the safety management activities, hazards
identiﬁed, decisions made, and solutions adopted, are recorded or
referenced [36]. Software veriﬁcation results indicate the procedures
that passed or failed for each software review, analysis, and test,
including coverage analyses and traceability analyses [37]. Both types
supported by a large international advisory board with over 20 
organizations from Asia, Europe, and North America. The insights 
have been gained in OPENCOSS from information about actual 
assurance practices at the OPENCOSS partners and the members of 
the advisory board, as well as at other companies that have participated 
in large surveys [6,7]. Practitioners have also validated the OPENCOSS 
results that correspond to turning these insights into conceptual 
frameworks and software tools. Therefore, we argue that the analysis 
of SACM can show the relevance of the standard to practice.
We have read the SACM speciﬁcation and created SACM models 
(see examples in Appendix A) to determine what and how safety 
evidence information could be speciﬁed with the standard. This allows 
us to analyse whether SACM meets the safety evidence management 
needs that were identiﬁed in OPENCOSS (e.g., [10]) and to identify 
possible weaknesses. The needs are based on the requirements stated 
by the project's consortium and advisory board, and on requirements 
determined in large reviews of the state of the art [5] and practice [6,7]. 
The needs have been validated in OPENCOSS, including validation via 
three case studies in the automotive, avionics, and railway application 
domains, respectively. Nonetheless, this paper represents only our 
perspective on SACM and other people might not share them. We also 
use conceptual modelling principles [11] and model quality guidelines 
[12] in order to identify modelling needs and recommendations (e.g., 
avoidance of concept redundancy) that SACM might not be addressing 
adequately.
The analysis has resulted in the identiﬁcation of elements that need 
to be clariﬁed, might be inconsistent, might not be suitable, or could be 
included in SACM for safety evidence management. Based on the 
results from the analysis and on the current insights into SACM in the 
literature, we discuss improvement opportunities and extension possi
bilities. The results of the analysis can be very valuable for practitioners 
assessing SACM adoption, vendors that develop tool support for SACM 
and safety evidence management, researchers aiming to identify areas 
for further research on safety evidence management, and the people 
involved in the speciﬁcation of the standard as they can identify 
possible improvements in future versions. In addition, and to the best 
of our knowledge, this paper contains the largest available SACM 
analysis.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews 
related work. Section 3 analyses safety evidence management with 
SACM, whereas Section 4 synthesises and discusses the ﬁndings. 
Section 5 summarises our conclusions and future work. Finally, 
Appendix A presents examples of SACM models.
2. Related work
Assessing the quality and suitability of standard modelling lan
guages has been a common strand of research work. BPMN (Business 
Process Model and Notation) [13] and UML (Uniﬁed Modeling 
Language) [14] are well known examples of these standards. The 
publications that have analysed them have found issues related to 
concept redundancy [15], language complexity [16], and inadequate 
concept representation [17], among others. This kind of study has 
aimed at identifying improvement opportunities and extension possi
bilities in the standards in order to facilitate their use. It is common 
that OMG standards are revised and new versions are released for 
enhancement.
We have previously shown that prior research has provided few 
insights into SACM [9]. SACM has been mostly referred to as an 
initiative that exists (e.g., [18]) or with which a correspondence could 
be established (e.g., [19]). Publications on safety evidence management 
[20], safety argumentation [4], safety compliance [19], and security 
assurance [21] have referred to SACM. We further concluded that 
detailed SACM analyses were necessary, including analyses of SACM 
suitability for speciﬁc purposes. Other aspects that could be addressed 
are the speciﬁcation of further SACM usage examples, the use of SACM
3
4of artefacts are commonly managed in most safety critical domains and 
used as safety evidence [6]. For example, a hazard log could be used as 
evidence of closure of all safety requirements by means of e.g. tests and 
analyses. Appendix A contains SACM models of the examples used in 
this section. 
SACM aims to provide a modelling framework that allows users to 
1;>Xpn;>-':l-~ and exchange their arg\1ment stn1ct,1n;>-~ and the as.~ociated 
evidence information. The standard contains those elements that its 
authors regard as fundamental for these tasks, and the elements are 
aligned with current assurance case specification practice, e.g. with 
GSN and with CAE. SACM is divided into an Evidence Metamodel and 
an Argumentation Metamodel. 
The Evidence Metamodel defines a catalogue of elements for 
constructing and interchanging precise statements involved in evi 
dence related efforts. This metamodel aims to: (a) identify the main 
factors that determine the evidence collection process; (b) identify the 
main factors that determine the evaluation of evidence; (c) identify and 
define the elements of evidence; and, (d) define a common interchange 
format to facilitate the exchange of information between different 
software assurance tools and services. 
The Argumentation Metamodel defines the catalogue of elements 
for constructing and interchanging structured statements describing 
argumentations. SACM defines 'argument' as a body of information 
presented with the intention to establish one or more claims through 
the presentation of related supporting claims, evidence, and contextual 
information. A structured argument is a particular kind of argument 
where the relationships between the asserted claims, and from the 
evidence to the claims, are explicitly represented. Evidence and thus 
evidence management are essential aspects in argumentation. 
SACM aims to allow a user to independently use the Argumentation 
and Evidence Metamodels. For example, a user should be able to create 
Argument Models without using the Evidence Metamodel. In this 
sense, SACM distinguishes between evidence specific information, 
which does not depend on the argument structure in which evidence 
is used (e.g., the creator of a document), and argumentation based 
evidence information (e.g., regarding evidence support to a given 
argument claim; aka subject claim). The first type of information can 
be reused in different arguments. SACM explicitly indicates that 
Evidence Models can be used in support of multiple assurance cases. 
The Evidence Metamodel has four main logical parts: (1) evidence 
items (e.g., the software verification results) part, which defines the 
physical evidence (e.g., the document that reports software verification 
results); (2) formal elements part, which defines the logical assertions, 
provided in the form of individual propositions (e.g., the definition of 
'software verification results' as a formal object for making assertions 
about it in an assurance case); (3) evidence assertions part, which 
defines various statements that can be made about the evidence items 
(e.g., for indicating that the custodian of the software verification 
results is a given person), and; (4) administration part, which can be 
used to organise individual evidence items and evaluations into a 
package that becomes a unit of exchange (e.g., for specifying that the 
software verification results are part of a larger evidence container 
called 'software artefacts'). 
The analysis performed on SACM has been divided into nine areas: 
notion of evidence, evidence lifecycle, evidence elements, exhibit 
properties, formal statements, evidence properties, evidence evalua 
tion, administration, and argumentation. SACM class diagrams, 
classes, attributes, associations, enumerations, and enumeration lit 
erals are highlighted in italics hereafter. Further details about SACM 
elements (e.g., their definition and information about their semantics 
and constraints) can be found in the SACM specification [1]. 
3.1. Notion of evidence 
In general, evidence can be defined as the available body of facts or 
information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid 
[38]. In SACM, Evidence is defined as information or objective 
artefacts being offered in support of one or more claims, whereas 
Evidence Item is defined as a unique element of the body of evidence, 
such as an exhibit, a claim, or other element of meaning associated with 
an exhibit. 
Many experts have agreed upon the need for evidence based safety 
demonstration, based on the 'gt1i1ty ,rnti] plY.lv1;>n innoc1;>nt' argt1ment 
(e.g., [39]): a system should not be deemed safe unless safety is 
demonstrated, and safety evidence must be provided. It is true that a 
system supplier might develop a safe system despite not being able to 
demonstrate it, but this is not acceptable for critical applications. On 
the other hand, safety of a real, large system cannot be really shown, 
and some degree of uncertainty will always exist. For example, the 
inexistence of residual errors cannot be demonstrated. Therefore, and 
as introduced above, safety evidence can be defined as artefacts that 
contribute to developing confidence in the safe operation of a system 
and that can be used to show the fulfilment of the criteria of a safety 
standard [SJ. For example, a hazard log cannot be used as proof of a 
complete absence of hazards for a system, but can help a certifier 
develop confidence in its safe operation. Many experts use the notion 
'system X is acceptably safe' (e.g., [4]). Acceptability and thus 
confidence in safety will depend on a system's purpose, usage, and 
application domain. 
The main difference between the definition in the previous para 
graph and SACM definitions is that we do not think that information 
per se (e.g., a statement), without being provided as part of some 
tangible element such as a document or in an electronic file such as a 
system diagram created with a modelling tool, should be regarded as 
safety evidence. Safety evidence should only correspond to existing, 
available artefacts, which can be used as evidence, e.g. a hazard log. 
Some SACM concepts are classified as evidence items but in our 
opinion they should not be regarded as evidence. For example, the 
overall definition of Evidence Item refers to a claim as one of the 
elements that is an evidence item, and Formal Assertion (see Sections 
3.3 and 3.5) specialises Evidence Item. We think that a claim or SACM 
formal assertion (e.g., "the hazard log shows the closure of all safety 
requirements") should not be regarded as safety evidence. Although 
they are information, and more concretely they can be assurance 
information, they are not artefacts. A safety claim can contribute to 
developing confidence in the safe operation of a system, but its validity 
and truth should be challenged unless the claim is supported by 
evidence. Basically, a claim itself, in isolation, barely contributes to 
safety demonstration. Stating that all the reviews of a software system 
have been passed, without providing evidence in the form of software 
verification results, is not safety evidence. Classifying a claim as an 
SACM evidence item can lead to a wrong interpretation of what safety 
evidence is, and thus to weak safety assurance, especially considering 
all the characteristics that SACM defines for Evidence Item (see e.g. 
Section 3.4). We think that information should be regarded as evidence 
only when it is available in some artefact, which could be used as 
evidence. 
We have previously discussed [20,22] that an artefact is not safety 
evidence in itself, in isolation, but that an artefact can be used as 
evidence of some safety claim. For example, a hazard log is an artefact 
that can be used as evidence of the claim 'system hazards have been 
identified'. In other words, an artefact plays a role as evidence when 
associated to a claim. This is shown in Fig. 2, which we have created 
Artefact 
Piece of 
Evidence 
Claim 
Fig. 2. Overall notion of safety evidence. 
5and makes an explicit difference between an artefact and a piece of 
evidence. As a result of its use as safety evidence, an artefact can have 
new properties and relations. For example, the use of an artefact as 
evidence can support a claim, with a given level of confidence. The most 
similar notions to piece of evidence in SACM are the Asserted Evidence 
and Asserted Counter Evidence classes of the Argumentation 
Metamodel (see Section 3.9), but not Evidence Item. However, the 
Argumentation Metamodel allows the use of Evidence Element (see 
Section 3.3), which generalises many types of information that are not 
artefacts, as evidence or counter evidence of a claim. This is a too broad 
usage in our opinion. 
We further think that confusion can easily arise in SACM usage 
because of specifying specialisation relationships such as 'a document 
is an evidence item' (see Section 3.3). As indicated in conceptual 
modelling principles [11], this specialisation implies that a document 
has the same attributes as an evidence item. However, and as discussed 
above, a document can exist without being used as evidence. Therefore, 
we advocate the perspective of 'a document is used as an evidence 
item'. Although an introductory passage of SACM indicates that a 
document becomes evidence only when it is claimed to provide 
evidentiary support to a certain subject claim ([1]; Section 7.6, page 
24), this notion is not represented in the Evidence Metamodel. 
In summary, and as further discussed below, we think that the 
unclear definition and use of Evidence Item in SACM can lead to 
ambiguity and misinterpretation of what safety evidence is and thus to 
inadequate safety evidence management. 
3.2. Evidence lifecycle 
Fig. 3 shows the lifecycle proposed in SACM for Evidence Item. 1 
Although the lifecycle is non normative, it provides a view of how 
SACM considers that an evidence item can evolve. The lifecycle consists 
of a single state after an evidence item has been created, acquired, or 
derived, and before it is revoked. During its lifecycle, an evidence item 
can be transferred, evaluated, or re evaluated. Although the usefulness 
of a lifecycle with a single state might be debatable, the proposed 
lifecycle at least explicitly indicates the possible events to create an 
evidence item and the possible events until it is revoked. 
There are some aspects of evidence lifecycle that do not seem to 
have been considered in SACM, or at least that are not clearly 
supported in the proposed lifecycle. Firstly, the safety evidence to 
provide for a system must be determined at the beginning of a project, 
and usually in agreement with e.g. a certification authority. This is the 
focus of e.g. Falessi et al. [ 40]. This publication indicates that the safety 
evidence to provide for a system must be specified and agreed between 
a system supplier and a certification authority. Several iterations might 
be necessary before reaching the agreement. 
Secondly, safety evidence evolution and change impact analysis 
could be better supported in SACM. In the scope of OPENCOSS 
[10,41], we have drawn the conclusion that an artefact used as safety 
evidence can have several states in a project. In a general and abstract 
way, and depending on the constraints specified for a project, the 
results of a test case might be valid as safety evidence, might be invalid, 
might need to be validated (i.e., it might have to be decided whether it 
is valid), or might need to be revoked. Test case results might be 
revoked if e.g. the tested source code changes, thus the test case should 
be re executed. Other evidence lifecycles can also be found in the 
literature [26]. 
Thirdly, we consider that the lifecycle proposed for evidence item 
might be inaccurate because all the elements that specialise Evidence 
Item (see Section 3.3) do not seem to follow it. For example, it does not 
seem suitable to us to model that an Object (e.g., the concept 'hazard'; 
1 All the figures of SACM elements and class diagrams correspond to excerpts from the 
SACM specification (1). 
Fig. 3. Evidence item lifecycle in SACM. 
see Section 3.5) has been evaluated. 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that evidence lifecycle, especially in 
relation to safety evidence evolution and change impact analysis, is an 
area that might require further research. An open question is whether a 
'standard' evidence lifecycle can really be defined. We have observed 
that companies have their own lifecycles (e.g., with a state called 
'frozen' to indicate that no changes are allowed to a given artefact), 
which might not be compatible with others. A possible solution could 
be to specify a generic, more abstract lifecycle. However, the gap 
between this lifecycle and the one used in a given company could be too 
big, hindering the usefulness of the standardised evidence lifecycle in 
practice. The challenge grows if the differences in safety assurance and 
certification practices among application domains and among certifica 
tion authorities are also considered [6]. 
3.3. Evidence elements 
The Evidence Elements section of the Evidence Metamodel consists 
of the Evidence Elements and Evidence Assertions class diagrams. This 
section defines the key concepts of the Metamodel. 
In the Evidence Elements class diagram (Fig. 4), Evidence Item is 
defined as an abstract class that represents objects that are collected as 
evidence. For example, a hazard log would be a document, and an 
evidence group might be created for compiling this log and other 
artefacts related to safety analysis results [5], such as documents with 
fault tree analysis, failure mode and effect analysis, etc. 
In our opinion, and in line with the explanation in Section 3.1, some 
classes that specialise Evidence Item should not be regarded as safety 
evidence. We consider that Exhibit, Document, Record, and Evidence 
Group are suitable, but Formal Object and Formal Assertion are not. 
We suggest that Formal Object and Formal Assertion are removed 
from the specialisation hierarchy shown in Fig. 4. 
The distinction between Record and Document is also strange to us 
because we understand that Record can have the same attributes and 
associations as Document and Exhibit (see Section 3.4). The only 
difference between the classes is that Exhibit is an object itself and 
Record overall represents information about a happening. For exam 
pie, the minutes of a meeting is a record for SACM, whereas a design 
specification is a document (exhibit). However, the need for this 
distinction is not clear in relation to their use as safety evidence. One 
could also easily argue that a design specification represents the fact of 
having designed a system, which matches Record. In essence, both 
Exhibit and Record seem to match our definition of safety evidence. It 
is also confusing that the description of Document in SACM refers to a 
recording as something that is a document, and that the description of 
Record indicates that records represent exhibits. Indeed, we consider 
that the definition, description, and semantics of Exhibit, Document, 
and Record should be improved for clarity and thus facilitating the 
correct use of these classes. 
Another major issue that we encounter in SACM is the granularity 
that it implies for the artefacts managed as safety evidence. Many 
artefacts that can be used as safety evidence do not fit the granularity 
Document and Record, but would be parts of, for instance, a document 
and would not constitute documents themselves. For example, a 
document such as a requirements specification could contain indivi 
dual safety requirements, which correspond to safety evidence. These 
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requirements can be referred to individually in a hazard log: for each 
hazard, the corresponding safety requirement that mitigates or avoids 
the hazard must be determined. 
It would also be beneficial that SACM provided guidance on when 
to use Evidence Group and when to use Evidence Container (see 
Section 3.8), and constraints upon the evidence elements for which 
provenance, timing, custody, and event information can be specified. 
For the latter, and as for other classes of the Evidence Metamodel, the 
current scope of Evidence Element regarding the specification of such 
information is too broad. More event types are defined (see Section 3.6) 
than what it is probably necessary for the management of e.g. the 
concept 'hazard' (Object). 
Evidence Assertion (Fig. 5) corresponds to statements about 
evidence items. This includes: essential properties of evidence items; 
properties of documents; statements about the custody, provenance, 
and timing of an evidence item; attributes of the evidentiary support; 
interpretation of the evidence; nature of the evidentiary support; 
observations; resolutions, and; standard of proof for evidence. 
Evidence Attribute, Evidence Property, and Evidence Evaluation are 
further presented in SACM in other class diagrams. 
It is strange to us that attributes and properties are classified as 
Evidence Assertion. For example, an evidence assertion would be used 
to specify that the results of a test case are part of software verification 
results, or to specify the version of a hazard log. This way of specifying 
characteristics is very different to other metamodels, including OMG 
ones, in which attributes and properties are included in classes instead 
of being regarded as statements about the classes. We think that this 
SACM characteristic can make it difficult both to understand concep 
tually and to align with other metamodels. We also discuss below that 
some evidence attributes and properties should probably be evidence 
evaluations. 
SACM proposes a lifecycle for Evidence Assertion that, as for 
Evidence Item (Section 3.2), consists of a single state. Once an evidence 
assertion is created, it can be evaluated or re evaluated before it is 
revoked. SACM has not taken into account the possibility that an 
evidence assertion can be regarded as valid or as invalid during its 
lifecycle. Further operations on an evidence assertion (e.g., the 
specification of its support to some claim) are not represented. As 
with Evidence Item, we consider that the lifecycle proposed for 
Evidence Assertion is too broad because some of the classes that 
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specialise this class do not follow the lifecycle. This is an important 
conceptual error in our opinion. For example, it does not seem suitable 
to us to model that a Timing Property of a piece of safety evidence such 
as At Time (Section 3.6) has been evaluated. 
We also think that different names to some of the classes that 
specialise Evidence Assertion would make their intent and scope much 
de.arer. For eJCample, the difference between Evid(!Jt('.(! .Attribut(! an,:! 
Evidence Property can be difficult to ascertain. These classes are 
described below. In fact, we think that the former should be called 
'Evidence Evaluation Attribute', and the latter 'Evidence Element 
Property' . Classes that refer to aspects of an artefact that are indepen 
dent of its use as evidence (e.g., its completeness; see Section 3.4) 
should probably not start with 'Evidence'. In addition, since evidence 
assertions can be used to model relations with subject claims, then 
evidence assertions of the Evidence Metamodel overlap with the 
Argumentation Metamodel. Overlaps between and redundancy of 
concepts, as with Evidence Assertion and Claim, are negative for the 
quality of a model or metamodel [12]. This is different to referring in a 
class diagram to a class that is introduced in another class diagram. 
Obviously, the interface between two parts of a model or metamodel 
has to be used in both places; this is not the kind of redundancy that we 
criticise. Finally, constraints should be specified to indicate which 
evidence elements can actually have each Evidence Property, to specify 
their consistency needs, and thus to correctly use the metamodel. 
3.4. Exhibit Properties 
The Exhibit Properties Section of the Evidence Metamodel consists 
of the Exhibit Properties and Document Properties class diagrams. 
This section defines elements that allow constructing statements about 
the fundamental properties of exhibits and documents. 
With Exhibit Property (Fig. 6), someone could specify that a hazard 
log entry (exhibit) is part of a hazard log (another exhibit), a hazard log 
can be based on a safety plan (evidence item), and a hazard log can 
have an electronic source in the form of a spreadsheet. 
An unclear aspect of the class hierarchy is that an exhibit can be 
based on an evidence item, which can correspond to some concepts 
that do not match our notion of safety evidence. For example, it can be 
specified that an exhibit (e.g., a hazard log) is based on, and thus has 
been generated from, a formal object (e.g., the concept 'hazard'). The 
use of Is Based On should probably only be allowed between exhibits. 
Is Part Of can only be specified in relation to another exhibit, which 
seems more suitable to us. The multiplicity of the associations of Is 
Based On and Is Part Qf with Evidence Item and Exhibit, respectively, 
is '1', and Is Based On and Is Part Qf do not seem to need further 
attributes or associations. Therefore, based on conceptual modelling 
principles [11], Is Based On and Is Part Qf are unnecessary (as classes) 
because (1) instances of them can only exist when associated to other 
classes and (2) the classes do not have other properties (e.g., emerging 
properties as a result of creating an association, as in the 'Piece of 
Evidence' class in Fig. 2). They should be modelled as associations of 
Exhibit with Evidence Item and Exhibit. 
SACM should also provide mechanisms for modelling further types 
of relationships and properties for exhibits, and allow the specification 
of more than one Has Electronic Source. If someone thinks of for 
example an architecture model as an exhibit, such a model could be 
specified in several electronic sources (files) representing different 
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architectural views. The support to the specification of further types of 
relationships is especially important because of the major role of 
traceability in the assurance and certification of safety critical systems 
[42]. 
The LA?cument Properties class diagram (Fig. 7) defines several 
possible characteristics of a document. Document Property specialises 
Exhibit Property (see Fig. 5). For some of these characteristics, a value 
in the form of a level can be specified from a predefined set of levels in 
an enumeration. For example, Consistency can be Unknown, Informal, 
Semiformal, or Formal. &tended Document Property can be used for 
defining further characteristics (see e.g. [24] for other possible 
characteristics). 
The unclear distinction between Document and Record becomes 
even more evident when considering document properties. We con 
sider that these properties could be equally specified for a record (e.g., 
the minutes of a meeting). 
Another aspect that has caught our attention is the different nature 
of the document properties regarding how to specify them. More 
concretely, we think that some properties of a document (e.g. a design 
specification) can be regarded as objective (e.g., Has Version), whereas 
others are subject to interpretation (e.g., Reliability, from unreliable to 
completely reliable). For the latter, we consider that it would probably 
be better to regard the properties as evaluations. They require a 
judgement, and the assigned value might have to be justified. This 
could even be done by means of an argument, in which someone could 
justify, for instance, why a document has been classified as Fairly 
Reliable. 
In addition, the use of the Has Version class does not seem to be 
suitable in SACM. A document (e.g., the hazard log) could have several 
versions, and each version could have different properties and be used 
for different purposes. For example, a given version of a document 
might be Incomplete, but another Final. Even different evidence 
assertions could be made for different versions of a same document. 
However, SACM does not adequately support the specification of this 
kind of information, and forces the creation of a new document for each 
new version if e.g. different properties have to be specified for different 
versions. We consider this to be an important weakness in SACM, and 
it can lead to issues when aiming to follow a document's lifecycle. For 
example, it can be hard to track the version of a hazard log used in a 
specific system lifecycle activity. 
Constraints should also be explicitly added regarding the possibility 
of specifying document properties only for documents, and how many. 
And finally, we feel that most of the classes of the Exhibit Properties 
Section could be turned into attributes of the other classes (e.g., 
Completeness could be an attribute of Document), or even should be 
according to conceptual modelling principles [11]. The information for 
the instances of the classes can only be specified in the scope of, for 
instance, a given document, and we understand that such information 
cannot be reused among different documents. Nonetheless, the way 
SACM has been structured could result from an implementation 
decision. The authors of SACM might have preferred that the users 
explicitly add attributes to documents. Although we think that this is 
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conceptually strange and could even be regarded as incorrect, it is valid 
from an implementation perspective. 
3.5. Formal statements 
The Formal Statements section of the Evidence Metamodel pro 
vides means for representing the elements of meaning involved in the 
processes of interpretation and evaluation of evidence required for 
precisely representing assertions. This section consists of the Formal 
Objects (Fig. 8) and Formal Assertions (Fig. 9) class diagrams, and 
provides a way to specify and structure the concepts and terms used in 
an SACM Model, e.g. the concept and term 'hazard log' of our running 
example. The section is aligned with and relates to SBVR (Semantics of 
Business Vocabulary and Rules) [43]. 
We have not found any major issue regarding how formal state 
ments can be specified (i.e., in their syntax and structure) beyond the 
facts that formal assertions might refer to subject claims, thus there is 
an overlap with the Argumentation Metamodel, and that a clearer 
explanation of the difference between Formal Assertion and Evidence 
Assertion would be helpful. Nonetheless, we have some concerns 
regarding the purpose, use, and semantics of formal statements. 
Firstly, it can be hard to understand why the Formal Objects and 
Formal Assertions class diagrams have been specified when SBVR is 
available. We wonder if a subset of SBVR could have been used. 
Secondly, the use of formal statements could easily increase the 
complexity of SACM application if, for instance, someone decided to 
specify all or most of the concepts and terms in an SACM Model with 
formal statements. Therefore, we think that the purpose of the formal 
statements should be clarified, as well as when they should be used and 
how. 
Finally, this section of SACM includes references to other sections 
and descriptions that can be hard to understand. For example, SACM 
text says: "Usually a Formal Object corresponds to an Exhibit where 
the Exhibit element emphasizes the physical object (an instance of the 
SBVR Thing' concept) while a Formal Object emphasizes the asso 
ciated element of meaning (an instance of the SBVR 'Meaning' 
concept)". Furthermore, circular references are specified in the 
Formal Assertions class diagram. This diagram refers to Claim from 
the Argumentation Metamodel, which also refers to the Evidence 
Metamodel. Circular references between the class diagrams of a 
metamodel can cause problems when creating or analysing a model 
[44 46]. 
In summary, why and how to use formal assertions, and more 
specifically for safety evidence management, is not completely clear to 
us. Further usage examples should be provided. We also suggest that 
the Formal Assertions Section should be a separate metamodel to 
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which the Argumentation Metamodel and the Evidence Metamodel 
refer. 
3.6. Evidence properties 
The Evidence Properties section of the Evidence Metamodel con 
sists of the Custody, Evidence Events, Provenance, and Timing class 
diagrams. All the root classes of these class diagrams (named as the 
class diagram, but in singular) are part of Evidence Element (composi 
tion association). 
Someone could specify with Custody Property (Fig. 10) that a given 
safety assurance manager is the custodian of an evidence element such 
as a hazard log, and that the hazard log has been created according to 
the indications of a given reference technique that indicates its 
expected structure and content (collection method). 
An aspect that we do not understand in this class diagram is that 
the multiplicity of the three associations is '1 '. The three classes also do 
not seem to have any specific relevant attribute, thus they might be 
unnecessary based on conceptual modelling principles [11]. The same 
information could be specified if the classes were removed and the 
associations were established between Evidence Element and Person, 
Organization, and Collection Method. The only association of Care Of, 
At Location, and Using Process is in the Evidence Events class 
diagram, but also in this case the same information could be specified 
without the classes. SACM should also include constraints regarding 
the use of custody properties (e.g., how many an evidence element 
could have). 
The attributes and associations of the classes that specialise 
Evidence Event (Fig. 11) are specified by means of tables that list 
their properties. This is different to the rest of SACM classes, thus we 
consider that a reader can get confused. Furthermore, the tables do not 
explicitly show what type of attribute or association each property 
corresponds to. This information should be included. The events seem 
to have associations with unnecessary classes. This should be revised. 
Another issue is that the Evidence Events class diagram is not 
consistent with the Evidence Item and the Evidence Assertion life 
cycles, as the sets of events do not coincide. SACM should be clearer 
about which evidence events could be specified for the different 
evidence elements, and provide constrains for Evidence Event use 
(e.g., regarding their number). The description of the evidence events 
should also be revised because we have identified some inconsistencies, 
and more concretely regarding their properties. For example, we do not 
understand why Owned By can be specified for all evidence event 
subtypes but Is Modified By. 
Regarding Provenance (Fig. 12), the source and owner of software 
verification results could be a verification manager, a tester could be 
among its executors, and a manager might approve it (supervisor). 
Again, and as argued for the specialisations of Custody Property, these 
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four classes might not be necessary. The same information could be 
specified without them, directly associating Evidence Element four 
times with Stakeholder. Provenance also seems to overlap with 
Evidence Event, and constraints should be included in SACM regarding 
what type of provenance apply to the different evidence elements and 
regarding how many provenance properties can be specified for a given 
evidence element. For example, we understand that the property 
Pe,formed By is not suitable for Object (e.g. the term 'hazard'), and 
that an object should not have more than one Created By. 
Analysing the Custody and Provenance class diagrams in more 
depth, both might be unnecessary. The same information of the 
alternative associations proposed above could be specified without 
the Custody Property and Provenance classes. Instead of creating 
associations with these two classes, the associations could be with 
Evidence Element and with Evidence Event. The only reason that we 
can find for keeping the Custody Property and Provenance classes is 
that someone wanted to specify e.g. when provenance started ('the 
hazard log is owned by the safety manager since June 10, 2016'). 
However, this can be specified with evidence events. Furthermore, the 
Custody, Evidence Events, and Provenance class diagrams lack con 
straints regarding the fact that some properties must only occur once. 
For example, a hazard log is created only once, and can be only at one 
location. 
We do not see the need for the Timing class diagram (Fig. 13). 
According to conceptual modelling principles [11], its information 
should be represented with attributes (e.g., of Evidence Event). It does 
not seem suitable to us to specify a timing property on its own, it has to 
be specified only when used in the scope of other classes, and a timing 
property cannot relate to several instances of other classes. In addition, 
it is not clear to us what Effective Time of Evidence Event means. 
Effective Time is an abstract class, thus one should use Start Time or 
End Time for Evidence Event, and referring to the start or end times of 
an event is not logical in our opinion. An event such as the creation of 
an artefact simply happens at a given moment and has no duration, so 
it is enough with the information of At Time in Evidence Event. This is 
also how events are understood and used in other modelling languages, 
e.g. BPMN and UML. In addition, constraints should be included 
necessary in SACM to avoid that e.g. two instances of At Time are 
assigned to an event. 
Finally, it is clear to us that not all SACM evidence elements (e.g., 
Organization) need all the above properties (e.g., Pe,formed By). A 
different class structure or constraints must be specified in SACM. This 
would very likely make the metamodel easier to understand and thus 
use. 
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3.7. Evidenc.e evaluation 
The Evidence Evaluation Section of the Evidence Metamodel 
consists of the Evidenc.e Relations, Evidenc.e Attributes, Evidenc.e 
Interpretation, Evidence Observations, and Evidence Resolutions class 
diagrams. A general characteristic of this section is that it overlaps with 
argumentation aspects. SACM explicitly indicates that evidence evalua 
tions provide information about the relationships of evidence items 
with subject claims (i.e., claims in an argument structure), and we 
~nsider that most of the content of this section should be, or already 
IS, part of the Argumentation Metamodel. Much information about 
evidence evaluations seems to correspond to confidence arguments 
[ 48), which aim to justify the adequacy of a given argument structure. 
All argumentation related aspects should be moved to the 
Argumentation Metamodel. In addition, most evidence evaluations 
are not reusable between assurance cases because they depend on 
subject claims, i.e. evidence evaluations in the scope of a subject claim 
(e.g., the support of the hazard log to a given safety claim) cannot be 
reused for another claim. This contradicts SACM purpose regarding the 
use of Evidence Models in support of multiple assurance cases. 
The Evidence Relations class diagram (Fig. 14) supports the 
specification of information such as "the evidence item 'hazard log' 
challenges the SACM formal assertion 'all the identified hazards have 
been mitigated or avoided'". Although this kind of information is 
necessary for safety evidence management, the allowed use of the 
Supports and Challenges classes is too broad. For example, we do not 
see why someone would want to specify that an SACM formal object, in 
e.g. the form of a concept such as 'hazard', supports a formal assertion 
(e.g., 'the hazard log shows the closure of all safety requirements'). The 
kind of assertions that can be made with Evidence Relation only seems 
suitable to us in the scope of an argument. We further discuss below 
(Section 3. 9) the possible overlap between the Argumentation and 
Evidence Metamodels of SACM. It is also not clear to us why Evidence 
Relation does not need to be always associated with Fonnal Assertion. 
It does not seem logical to us that someone specifies Supports or 
Challenges for Evidenc.e Item without referring to something. 
The classes that specialise Evidence Attribute {Fig. 15) have an 
attribute to specify their value, and in most of the cases according to an 
enumeration. Confidenc.e can for instance be Unknown, Reported As 
Uncertain, Reported As Plausible, or Reported As Fact. For the 
example in the previous paragraph regarding hazard mitigation or 
avoidance, the confidence in the assertion could be Reported As Fact 
(because the hazard log shows that some hazards have not been 
mitigated or avoided yet). Custom evidence attributes can be specified 
by means of Extended Evidence Attribute. 
We find four issues in the Evidence Attributes class diagram. First, 
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the possibility of assigning evidence attnbutes to evidence evaluations 
is too broad. SACM allows the specification of evidence attributes that 
do not seem suitable to us, such as "the strength of'Requirement Risa 
requirement' is 89". We also do not see when some evidence inter 
pretation might need an evidence attribute. Second, SACM proposes 
several enumerations for rating the attributes, but provides little 
information abo\1t wh11t the literals of the em1merations melln or how 
to decide upon the levels. Without such information, inconsistent use 
seems likely. For example, we wonder what 'the significance is medium 
Low' would mean. It can also even be difficult to distinguish between 
certain evidence attributes (e.g., Relevance and Significance). 
Therefore, it is likely that different people end up using Evidenc.e 
Attribute in inconsistent, different ways. Third, we think that the 
specialisations of Evidence Attribute might not be necessary, except 
Extended Evidence Attribute. The same information could be specified 
by means of attributes in Evidence Evaluation, without having to 
define new classes. In addition, and as discussed above for Timing 
Property, it is not logical to declare an evidence attribute unless it is 
associated to an evidence evaluation. Nonetheless, this could simply be 
an implementation decision in SACM. Another reason could be that 
SACM aims to allow a user to simultaneously specify, for instance, 
several levels of confidence for a same evidence evaluation. However, 
this is not explained and can even be considered illogical. Finally, 
SACM should specify constraints for the adequate use of Evidence 
Attribute with other evidence elements. For example, Relevance should 
only be specified when Supports is indirect. 
With the Evidence Interpretation class diagram (Fig. 16), someone 
could specify that a given report (evidence element) is a requirements 
specification (formal element), that the software verification results 
(evidence element) mean that 'actions have been taken for system 
verification' (formal assertion), and that a hazard log (evidence 
element) is scoped by the system or the component under considera 
tion (formal element). 
In our opinion, and as explained above for other classes, all the 
specialisations of Evidence Interpretation should be turned into 
associations, as their multiplicity is 'l' and the classes do not seem to 
have further relevant properties. This would also imply that Evidence 
Interpretation usage could be supported by associations, without any 
new class. In addition, the specialisations seem to overlap with the 
classes of the Argumentation Metamodel (except Is Scoped By and Is 
A) and of the Formal Statements Section. This should be revised. 
Again, and as for other class diagrams, the possible way of using this 
class diagram is probably too broad. It should more clearly specify what 
evidence elements (e.g., Exhibit) can be interpreted. 
. The Evidence Observation class diagram (Fig. 17) clearly overlaps 
with other parts of SACM. For example, a conflict can be specified with 
the Argumentation Metamodel (see Section 3.9). 
Regarding Evidence Resolution {Fig. 18) and its specialisations, we 
have found the same issues as in Evidence Observation regarding its 
overlap with argumentation. Some constraints might also be needed for 
the correct use of the specialisations. For example, Resolves should 
only be used for conflicts. Some descriptions could also be improved. 
The difference between Refutes and Challenges could be explained in 
more detail, and presenting Negates in SACM as an indirect refutation 
can be confusing. 
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Finally, our main overall concern with Evidence Evaluation is that 
most of the information that can be specified with it falls into the scope 
of argumentation and not of the management of the artefacts that can 
be used as safety evidence per se. This should be revised for an 
adequate, more integrated usage of the Evidence Metamodel and the 
Argumentation Metamodel. 
3.8. Administration 
The Administration section of the Evidence Metamodel consists of 
the Project, Project Elements, and Project Properties class diagrams. 
This section descnbes the elements of the Evidence Metamodel that are 
involved in managing and exchanging evidence, and defines the root 
object of an Evidence Model: Evidence Container. 
The Project class diagram (Fig. 19) shows the components of 
Evidence Container. An evidence container could, for instance, en 
compass all the information about the artefacts used as safety evidence 
for a system component: the information about the component 
assurance process. As explained below, the composition association 
between Project Property and Project Element is too broad. Some 
specialisations of Project Element do not seem to need Project 
Property, e.g. it does not seem necessary to indicate that an evidence 
request has a role in an organization. The inclusion of Evidence 
Evaluation in Evidence Container represents to us a clear overlap 
with the Argumentation Metamodel. It would also probably be more 
suitable that evidence evaluations belong to the evaluated evidence 
element, not to evidence containers. 
With the Project Elements class diagram (Fig. 20), someone could 
specify that software verification results are created for showing that a 
system satisfies its requirements (project objective) and that this 
artefact results from a software verification activity (activity) in which 
a system verifier (person) participates. Project elements relate to the 
process followed for system assurance. Modelling of this process is 
relevant for e.g. safety critical systems [ 47]. 
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The main issues that we have found in this class diagram are not 
strictly in itself, but in its associations and relationships with others. 
More concretely, the notion of Evidence Request is unclear to us 
because Evidence Item is unclear too. We have mentioned the issue 
with Project Property in the previous paragraph. Project Element is 
also a specialisation of Evidence Element (see Fig. 4), which has many 
characteristics that do not seem to apply to Project Element. We do not 
clearly see why someone would need to specify for assurance purposes 
that e.g. a person takes care of a method. Further inconsistent or 
incoherent information such as 'the organization O has been created 
using the tool T' can be specified with SACM. These issues must be 
fixed by adding constraints or changing the specialisation hierarchies. 
We also wonder about the extent to which Project Objective and Claim 
(from the Argumentation Metamodel) overlap. Although the descrip 
tion of Activity indicates that it can be used to specify an executed 
action or an action to execute, no mechanism is provided to distinguish 
between these states. Finally, we do not understand why Collection 
Method includes 'Collection' in its name. Its specialisations, and the 
means used for safety evidence management in general, do not aim 
only at evidence collection, but could also aim at other actions such as 
artefact generation or verification (e.g., a software testing tool). 
As mentioned above for other classes, most of the classes that 
specialise Project Property (Fig. 21) are not relevant for all the 
specialisations of Project Element, and Requires Container, Depends 
On, and Satisfies could be turned into associations ('1' multiplicity 
criterion). The scope of Depends On and of Satisfies seem too broad. 
More information is necessary about of types of the pairs of project 
elements that can be related via these concepts. It does not seem 
suitable to us to specify e.g. that a given tool satisfies a given person. 
SACM should further explicitly indicate which project properties could 
belong to an evidence container and which to a project element. 
The proposed values for Complies To, Container Consistency and 
Container Completeness might not fit the current practices and criteria 
of an organization, as explained above for ~cument Property. These 
classes might also need constraints for their adequate usage (e.g., can 
an evidence container be complete if some contained document is not?) 
and should probably be modelled as attributes of Evidence Container 
(see discussion above for e.g. evidence attributes). Although the 
enumeration for Complies To is called Standard Of Proof, it does not 
refer to compliance with e.g. safety standards. 
ProjectProperty 
ExtendedProjeet 1------ -1- ---1-C"'o;:n.:.:ta::.:l:,.ne::.rC.::co,c;m=le:::te:.e:.;:ne,:.,s:.:,cs-rl 
Pro +value : Com etenessLevel 
+coolainer 
EvideneeContainer 
+version : String 
+gid : String 
+name : Sirin 
ContalnerConslstene 
+value : Consistenc Level 
HasRoleln 
+element 1 +element 1 +organizar;oo 
Pro ·ectElement 
+name : String 
+content : Sirin 
Fig. 2 1. Project property class diagram. 
Or anization 
+address : Strin 
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Evidence:: 
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+content : Sirin 
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+evidence Element J: I I Argum1H1tEl1m1nt ! E • I Argumentation 
+target +argumentElcment 
Information Element Reasonln Element 
lnformatlonCltatlon 
Element 
l' I 
~-A_s_s_e_rt_io_n_~I I ArgumentReasoning I 
+url : Sirin 
Claim 
+assumed : Boolean 
+toBeSu rted : Boolean 
Assertedlnferenc;e AssertedChallen e AssertedCounterEvldenc;e 
Fig. 22. Argumentation class diagram. 
AssuranceCase 
~--~ +name : String 
+id : Si rin 
+argument LJ 
+assuranceCase 
Argumentation :: 
Ar umentation 
i +evldence 
Evidence :: 
EvidenceContainer 
Fig. 23. Assurance case structure. 
3.9. Argumentation 
By argumentation, we refer to the elements of the Argumentation 
Metamodel, and more concretely to those related to safety evidence. This 
metamodel corresponds to the Argumentation class diagram (Fig. 22). 
In SACM, an assurance case (Fig. 23) consists of a set of Argumentations 
(from the Argumentation Metamodel) that correspond to its argument, 
and a set of Evidence Containers (from the Evidence Metamodel) that 
correspond to its evidence. 
An evidence element (e.g., the software verification results) or 
evidence container (all the evidence information for a given software 
component) can be used in an Argumentation by means of Information 
Citation Element. This Argumentation Element enables the citation of a 
source of information that relates to a structured argument. The 
declaration of relationship is made by means of Asserted Relationship. 
This class is specialised into Asserted Inference, Asserted Evidence, 
Asserted Counter Evidence, Asserted Context and Asserted Challenge. 
The source or Asserted Evidence and Asserted Counter Evidence must 
be Information Element. 
The main issue that we find in the Argumentation Metamodel is 
that the relation between Evidence Element and Information Citation 
Element implicitly means that any Evidence Element can be used as 
Evidence. As discussed in Section 3.1, we think that this is not correct, 
or at least that it is ambiguous. It is also hard to understand why some 
classes of the Evidence Metamodel and the Argumentation Metamodel 
seem to overlap. Three specialisations of Asserted Relationship used 
for claims (Asserted Evidence, Asserted Counter Evidence, Asserted 
Inference, and Asserted Challenge) seem to be very similar to classes of 
the Evidence Metamodel that can be used for Formal Assertion (e.g., 
Supports and Challenges in the Evidence Relation class diagram). As 
indicated above, all argumentation related aspects should be moved to 
the Argumentation Metamodel. 
Another possible inconsistency between the Evidence Metamodel 
and the Argumentation Metamodel is the existence of a circular 
reference. Claim is referred to in the Formal Assertions class diagram 
as a class associated to Referenced Claim. However, we understand 
that the link between the Evidence Metamodel and the Argumentation 
Metamodel should only be via the use of evidence in an argument. We 
further doubt that Referenced Claim is a really necessary class, taking 
into account the conceptual modelling principles regarding what an 
entity type is or if two entity types represent the same concept [11]. 
Nonetheless, and as acknowledged for other SACM classes, this could 
correspond to a design or implementation decision whose rationale is 
not described in the standard. The Argumentation Metamodel also 
allows the use of Asserted Evidence and Asserted Counter Evidence for 
modelling evidentiary support of Information Element to more than 
one claim. We think that this can lead to weak or inadequate 
argumentation structures because some characteristics of a piece of 
evidence depend on single claims [ 48]. For example, the use of a hazard 
log as evidence could be appropriate for a claim such as "System 
hazards have been identified and recorded" but not for " All the possible 
system hazards have been mitigated or avoided". For the latter, there 
might still exist some unknown system hazards. 
4. Discussion 
This section presents improvement opportunities and extension 
possibilities in SACM, as a way to synthesise and summarise the 
analysis in Section 3. They represent recommendations so that the 
standard better supports safety evidence management. We also discuss 
analysis validity. 
It must be noted that the current SACM version was released some 
months ago, and that it is common that OMG standards undergo 
revisions as improvement opportunities are found. In fact, there are 
already plans for a 2.0 version [ 49]. The analysis in the previous section 
and the discussion in this section must not be regarded only as 
weaknesses or important deficiencies in SACM, but as aspects that 
might be taken into account in future versions in order to make the 
standard more suitable for safety evidence management and to 
facilitate its application. 
According to Martin [50], SACM 2.0 will aim to improve its support 
for IEC 15026 2 and for GSN, to harmonize some parts, to support 
patterns, templates, and structured expressions, and to improve SACM 
modularity and simplicity. These aspects complement those discussed 
below. Unlike Martin [50], we provide details about how to improve 
and extend SACM, and focus on safety evidence management. It must 
also be mentioned that we analysed SACM and listed the improvement 
1) Inclusion of more examples. The area that probably requires
further improvement in SACM is the lack of examples for the vast
majority of classes and associations of the Evidence Metamodel.
SACM annexes just provide a small Argumentation Model, we have
not found Evidence Models in the literature, and the few examples
in the Evidence Metamodel are too abstract in our opinion.
Provision of examples will be essential to clarify the classes and
associations, and thus to be able to determine the real need for
removing or modifying them. The examples would also provide
further guidance on how and when to use SACM elements.
2) Clariﬁcation of the notion of evidence. Section 3.1 has discussed
the notion of evidence in SACM, indicating several possible issues.
We consider that the main issue comes from using Evidence Item
and Evidence Element for a variety of concepts that, to our
understanding, do not correspond to evidence in general and to
safety evidence in particular. An alternative term might be used. For
example, the term Assurance Asset is used in OPENCOSS for
classifying assurance information that contributes to developing
conﬁdence in the safe operation of a system, such as an artefact or
the execution of an activity [51].
3) Clariﬁcation of the notion of evidence assertion. It is not comple
tely clear what SACM means by Evidence Assertion, thus we argue
that this concept needs to be better deﬁned in the standard. To our
understanding, it is an assertion about a piece of (safety) evidence
that does not need to be justiﬁed and that does not require an
argument. The corresponding artefact will suﬃce to show assertion
validity. For the hazard log, a possible evidence assertion is “The
hazard log includes system hazards”. Furthermore, Evidence
Assertion is used for aspects such as the properties of a document.
We think that, as in other metamodels and in general, properties
should simply be included in the classes (e.g., Document) as
attributes, instead of implying that a property is something asserted
about a document.
4) Reduction in the number of classes and associations. Based on
conceptual modelling principles [11], several classes and associa
tions of the Evidence Metamodel are probably not necessary.
Basically, several classes could or even should be modelled as
associations. A high number of elements in a metamodel also aﬀects
negatively its quality [12,15], making it more complex to under
stand and maintain.
5) Restructuring of classes and associations. The restructuring of
several SACM parts has been proposed in Section 3. Among them,
we regard as especially important to carefully restructure the
Formal Statements Section, since it introduces circular references
in the metamodel. SACM would also beneﬁt from a clearer
separation of evidence concerns and argumentation concerns.
Several classes of the Evidence Metamodel seem to fall into the
scope of argumentation, as their use might be associated with an
argument that justiﬁes the information provided (e.g., Reliability of
Document).
6) Redundancy reduction. Some kinds of information can be speciﬁed
in several ways with SACM. This is a result of the overlaps that seem
to exist between classes and associations. For example, it seems that
Supports and Asserted Evidence can be used for the same purpose.
Redundancy is a characteristic that should be avoided in a
metamodel [12,15], thus overlaps between classes must be ad
dressed.
7) Reduction in the scope of some classes. We have indicated that the
scope of several classes (e.g., Project Element) is probably too broad
because not all their specialisations have all their attributes and
associations. This can be solved by specifying constraints or by
restructuring the attributes and associations of the specialisations.
8) Further justiﬁcation of the need for the classes and associations. In
general, the need for many classes of the Evidence Metamodel, their
purpose, and how to use them should be presented in more detail.
Otherwise, it is diﬃcult to determine if a class should be in the
metamodel, or if an instance of the class should be included in a
model. This might be a common issue in OMG standardisation
eﬀorts [52]. There is usually a rationale behind all the elements of a
metamodel although it is not provided.
9) Consistent concept deﬁnition. Several key concepts are deﬁned
several times in SACM, in diﬀerent parts of SACM document (e.g.,
Evidence Item, Evidence Assertion, Claim, and Argument). This
can make SACM diﬃcult to understand, especially when the
deﬁnitions are inconsistent and considering the central role of
some concepts for assurance case creation and safety evidence
management. For example, one of the deﬁnitions of Evidence Item
in SACM indicates that claims are evidence items, but others do not
and only refer to e.g. physical elements. Problems with terminology
and diﬃculties to agree upon it have been reported for other OMG
standards [53].
It must be noted that most of the improvement opportunities above
are not independent, but that relations exist between them. For
instance, the inclusion of more examples might help to clarify the
notions of evidence and evidence assertion.
Table 1 indicates which SACM aspects (subsections of Section 3)
would beneﬁt from each improvement opportunity. From a general
perspective, the improvement opportunities that we have found most
frequently, based on the number of SACM aspects, are the clariﬁcation
of the notion of evidence and the further justiﬁcation of the need for the
classes and associations (seven aspects). Evidence Evaluation is the
SACM aspect that can beneﬁt from a highest number of improvement
opportunities.
In addition to the above improvement opportunities, the following
aspects would also represent an advantage for SACM:
• Further tool support, which might have allowed the identiﬁcation of
some of the issues mentioned in this paper and facilitate the
identiﬁcation of others; we are not aware of any tool that imple
ments the Evidence Metamodel of SACM 1.0 or 1.1.
• Graphical representation of all the attributes and associations of the
classes, so that a user can gain a deeper understanding of the scope
of each class when checking the class diagrams.
• Text revision, including class, attribute, and association naming, for
ﬁxing some errors and helping a reader to more easily understand
the standard.
4.2. Extension possibilities
By extension possibilities in SACM, we refer to the existence of
concepts and relationships that are not represented in the standard but
opportunities and extensions possibilities before being aware of [50], 
thus it has not inﬂuenced us.
As we have discussed in similar analyses [17], the improvement 
opportunities and extension possibilities that we propose are not 
unsubstantial or unnecessary. They can contribute to improving 
SACM and to making the standard more suitable for assurance in 
general and for safety evidence management in particular. For exam
ple, we argue that a clearer deﬁnition of SACM would lead to a more 
eﬀective standard. A simpler deﬁnition, in which e.g. overlaps are 
reduced, would probably also contribute to this objective.
4.1. Improvement opportunities
By improvement opportunities, we mainly refer to the existence of 
classes and associations that might need to be clariﬁed or might not be 
necessary (e.g., they are redundant). These improvements would 
enable an easier understanding of SACM use and thus an easier use 
for safety evidence management. We consider that the main general 
improvement opportunities in SACM can be summarised as follows.
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might be necessary for safety evidence management. These extensions
would make SACM more suitable for this activity. We consider that the
main extension opportunities relate to the following areas.
1) Evidence Item and Evidence Assertion lifecycles. We have indi
cated that evidence items and evidence assertions, as well as pieces
of safety evidence, artefacts, and assurance information in general,
can have more states than those currently represented in SACM.
Therefore, the lifecycles proposed in SACM could be extended. This
extension could also include the speciﬁcation of preconditions for
the lifecycle events.
2) Evidence usage throughout its lifecycle. We have explained that
evidence lifecycle aspects such as the speciﬁcation of the version of
a document that is used in an activity are not adequately repre
sented in SACM. Therefore, a wider, better support for evidence
usage and lifecycle is an area that can drive some extensions in
SACM.
3) Evidence change impact analysis. Pieces of safety evidence, as well
as assurance cases, evolve during their lifecycle. The corresponding
changes might impact other elements of an SACM Model, and
actions might have to be taken so that a body of safety evidence
remains valid. Change management and impact analysis are barely
supported in SACM currently, and it might be useful to take them
into account in future versions. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that
evidence change impact analysis and assurance case evolution are
areas that probably require further research before eﬀectively
deﬁning common, standardised practices.
4) Means for compliance with safety standards. Last but not least,
SACM does not explicitly support the speciﬁcation of how a system
complies with a safety standard. Although it could be done by
means of, for instance, claims or formal assertions, we think that
explicit support in the form of classes and associations for
compliance modelling would be positive. This kind of approach
has been proposed and discussed in [19].
4.3. Validity
We discuss the validity of our analysis according to the perspectives
proposed by Wohlin et al. [54].
Construct validity is concerned with the relationship between a
theory behind an investigation and its observation. Some issues that
have been indicated might simply correspond to errors in the SACM
document (e.g., the multiple deﬁnition of Evidence Item). In addition,
no standard deﬁnition of safety evidence exists and we have adopted a
deﬁnition [5] as basis for the analysis. Nonetheless, such a deﬁnition is
based on a large scale systematic literature review [5] and has been
later validated in surveys with practitioners [6,7]. This makes us
conﬁdent in its validity. Having analysed SACM with real data from
OPENCOSS partners might threat construct validity because data from
other real projects might show diﬀerent characteristics of safety
evidence management practice.
Internal validity is concerned with the causal, observed relation
ship between a treatment and its results. Although we consider that we
have been cautious and rigorous, three main characteristics of the
analysis might have posed threats to internal validity. First, our
background on model driven engineering and conceptual modelling
(e.g., [17,19]), and thus our experience in creating, using, and
analysing other metamodels and conceptual models, might have made
us study SACM from a given perspective. This could have been the
reason of, for instance, ﬁnding an issue in regarding Document
Property as Evidence Assertion (Section 3.3). Second, most of the
issues indicated are based on insights from OPENCOSS. We trust the
insights from prior studies in OPENCOSS, since they have been large
(high number of data points) and wide (heterogeneity of the sample),
but cannot guarantee that other safety evidence management aspects
did not need to have been taken into account. Third, there is a threat in
the possibility of having misinterpreted SACM text and class diagrams.
We consider that this threat is inherent to the analysis of any text,
including the text of a modelling standard. Nonetheless, all the authors
reviewed the results of the analysis to mitigate the threat, and when
considered necessary, we discussed the results to agree upon a common
interpretation of SACM text and class diagrams. Finally, there is an
Table 1
Improvement opportunities outline.
SACM aspect
Notion of
evidence
Evidence
lifecycle
Evidence
elements
Exhibit
properties
Formal
statements
Evidence
properties
Evidence
evaluation
Administration Argumentation
Improvement
opportunities
Inclusion of more
examples
X X X X X X
Clariﬁcation of the
notion of evidence
X X X X X X X
Clariﬁcation of the
notion of evidence
assertion
X X X X X X
Reduction in the
number of classes
and associations
X X X X
Restructuring of
classes and
associations
X X X X
Redundancy
reduction
X X X X
Reduction in the
scope of some
classes
X X X X X X
Further justiﬁcation
of the need for the
classes and
associations
X X X X X X X
Consistent concept
deﬁnition
X X X X X X
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support other activities (e.g., change impact analysis). Therefore, a
reader should be cautious when analysing SACM suitability for
evidence management according to the proposed extensions.
Addressing the improvement opportunities is especially important.
It would reduce SACM complexity, which would in turn facilitate its
understanding, promote its use, and help a reader to ﬁnd further
improvement opportunities and extension possibilities. Based on the
analysis, our overall conclusion is that SACM can be suitable for safety
evidence management in the scope of a safety case, as long as the use of
SACM is focused on the Argumentation Metamodel to specify the
evidence elements that support or relate to safety arguments and
claims, such as the evidence asserted for them. Few issues have been
identiﬁed in the Argumentation Metamodel, most of them correspond
to overlaps and inconsistencies with the Evidence Metamodel, and we
think that these issues can be easily addressed. Nonetheless, the use of
SACM should be tailored, selecting the classes from the Evidence
Metamodel that are really necessary and deciding upon how to use
them. For example, the use of all the SACM evidence elements as
evidence in a safety case should be constrained because some of these
elements (e.g., evidence assertions) should not be regarded as artefacts
that can support a safety claim. It is very important that a user is aware
of the possible limitations in SACM usage. For safety evidence manage
ment activities beyond the scope of a safety case, we argue that SACM is
not the best alternative and that other models better support the whole
safety evidence lifecycle (e.g., [20,51]). We also consider that provision
of evidence in general and in SACM in particular should be artefact
centred. This could be achieved by clarifying and reducing the scope of
most of the content of the Evidence Metamodel.
Although several issues, improvement opportunities, and extension
possibilities have been discussed, SACM provides a great basis towards
standardizing and improving assurance case practices in general and
safety evidence management practices in particular. Before its creation,
most of the available knowledge was spread among diﬀerent sources,
e.g. literature on GSN, literature on CAE, and diﬀerent safety assurance
metamodels (see Section 2). Some insights were not even available, e.g.
a classiﬁcation of evidence events and a uniﬁed set of properties to
evaluate pieces of evidence in the form of a document. There has also
been a clear progress from the Beta versions of SACM to the 1.0
version, and from the 1.0 version to the 1.1 one, thus we expect also
progress and improvements in the upcoming versions. It must also be
noted that SACM needs to be generic and support general assurance
and assurance case speciﬁcation practices. SACM is not targeted only at
safety evidence management, and it should not be targeted at project
or company speciﬁc practices.
The analysis presented focuses on SACM 1.1. Although SACM
might evolve in the future as OMG standards typically do, SACM 1.1
will be the version to use of the standard until a new one is published.
The analysis points out aspects that could be addressed not only in
future versions but also when using the current one, e.g. reducing the
number of classes to use to avoid overlaps. Many insights from the
analysis are also valuable to people interested in creating a metamodel
or analysing other metamodels, as we indicate general modelling
aspects to take into account, and we have presented information about
how safety evidence management should be performed in order to
explain the analysis. This information can be useful to anyone
interested in safety evidence management. Finally, it is always neces
sary to analyse the current version of a given standard to provide
suggestions for future versions, as it has been done in the past for e.g.
BPMN and UML.
As future work, we plan to continue developing new approaches for
improving safety evidence management practices. We are currently
working on the deﬁnition of new means for automating safety evidence
collection from diﬀerent engineering tools and for safety evidence
traceability. We would also like to perform a similar analysis to the
OMG Dependability Assurance Framework [55] once it is released, and
perform a detailed comparison of SACM with the metamodels created
inherent threat to internal validity due to the fact that we used a 
speciﬁc set of examples and real cases as basis for the analysis, 
including for the creation of SACM models. Diﬀerent examples and 
cases might yield diﬀerent analysis results. For example, other issues 
might be identiﬁed in SACM.
Conclusion validity is concerned with the relationship between a 
treatment and its outcome. In our opinion, the main threat is that the 
analysis performed is probably beyond SACM scope. SACM focuses on 
evidence for assurance cases, whereas safety evidence management is a 
wider activity. For example, most of the extension possibilities seem to 
be out of the current SACM scope, thus this is probably the reason why 
some concepts are not currently represented in the standard. Anyway, 
it is also true that SACM 1.1 includes classes and associations for 
managing evidence beyond their use in an assurance case (e.g., 
Activity). The threats to construct and internal validity must also be 
taken into account before drawing deﬁnite conclusions about SACM 
support for safety evidence management.
External validity is concerned with the generalization of the 
conclusions of an investigation. The analysis performed on SACM has 
focused on how it supports safety evidence management, thus it can be 
hard to generalise the ﬁndings to other assurance activities. 
Nonetheless, we believe that other activities can also beneﬁt from most 
of the improvements and extensions proposed. Most of the aspects 
acknowledged for safety evidence also apply to any type of evidence 
(e.g., clariﬁcation of the notion of evidence), and evidence is the basis 
for other activities (e.g., argumentation). Many issues are inherent in 
SACM (e.g., unnecessary classes), regardless of its usage purpose. 
Regarding the threat of having used a reduced set of examples (e.g., 
hazard log and software veriﬁcation results) for showing how SACM 
can be used and its limitations, we argue that the examples used are 
valid representatives of what safety evidence is and how it is managed.
5. Conclusion
Provision of assurance is essential for many critical systems, and 
the speciﬁcation of structured assurance cases is a common practice in 
many domains. Several initiatives currently exist towards the deﬁnition 
of standard means for assurance case speciﬁcation. Safety evidence 
must be further managed as part of the assurance process and 
assurance case speciﬁcation. Therefore, standardisation eﬀorts for 
assurance case speciﬁcation must take safety evidence management 
into account.
This paper has analysed how SACM (Structured Assurance Case 
Metamodel) supports safety evidence management. To the best of our 
knowledge, the paper is the largest and deepest available SACM 
analysis. Past analyses have dealt with very few SACM elements and 
have not presented details about the insights provided. Further, the 
analysis is very valuable for those studying SACM adoption, as it 
indicates possible issues and potential needs to address.
We have found issues or possible issues in all SACM class diagrams. 
Among the nine main improvement opportunities identiﬁed, we think 
that the most important areas, and thus the ones that should be 
addressed sooner, are the provision of more examples, the clariﬁcation 
of the notions of evidence and of evidence assertion, and a thorough 
analysis of the scope and of the need for some classes, including their 
overlaps. These improvements would signiﬁcantly contribute to clar
ifying SACM and how to use it. They would also impact the rest of the 
improvement opportunities because it would be easier to determine the 
extent to which they correspond to real issues in SACM and thus their 
importance. In addition, we have proposed four areas related to safety 
evidence management based on which SACM could be extended: 
evidence item and evidence assertion lifecycles, evidence usage 
throughout its lifecycle, evidence change impact analysis, and com
pliance with safety standards. Nonetheless, these aspects might be out 
of the scope of SACM if the standard aims to focus on evidence 
management for assurance case speciﬁcation and thus does not need to
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This appendix includes examples of SACM models in three diﬀerent ways: UML object diagrams (Figs. 24 and 25), a screenshot of a basic SACM
editor created with the Eclipse Modeling Framework [57] (Fig. 26), and a XML ﬁle corresponding to the output data of the editor. The main
container element of the model shown in Fig. 25 (‘System Evidence’ evidence container from Fig. 24 (a)) is not included in the ﬁgure for simplicity
and readability. The content of the models corresponds to the running examples used in Section 3. Models with real project data were also created in
the scope of the OPENCOSS project. However, these models cannot be shared for conﬁdentiality reasons.
The content of the XML ﬁle is as follows.
< ?xml version "1.0" encoding "UTF 8"? >
< SACM:AssuranceCase xmi:version "2.0" name "System Assurance Case" >
< argument id "System Argumentation" >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:Claim" id "Safety Requirements Closure" description "All safety
requirements have been closed"/ >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:Claim" id "Passed Reviews" description "All the reviews of the
software system have been passed"/ >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:Claim" id "Hazards Identiﬁed" description "System hazards have
been identiﬁed and recorded"/ >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:Claim" id "Hazard Absence"/ >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:AssertedEvidence" id "HL SRC" source "//@argument.0/@
argumentElement.5" target "//@argument.0/@argumentElement.0"/ >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:InformationCitationElement" id "Hazard Log Evidence"
evidenceElement "//@evidence.0/@item.2"/ >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:AssertedCounterEvidence" id "HL HA" source "//@argument.0/@
argumentElement.5" target "//@argument.0/@argumentElement.3"/ >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:Claim" id "Hazard Mitigation or Avoidance" description "All the
identiﬁed hazards have been mitigated or avoided"/ >
< argumentElement xsi type "Argumentation:AssertedEvidence" id "HL HI" source "//@argument.0/@
argumentElement.5" target "//@argument.0/@argumentElement.2"/ >
< /argument >
< evidence name "System Evidence Container" >
< evaluation xsi type "Evidence:Challenges" id "HL HMA" assertion "//@evidence.0/@item.17" subject "//@
evidence.0/@item.2" >
< attribute xsi type "Evidence:Conﬁdence" value "reportedAsFact"/ >
< /evaluation >
< evaluation xsi type "Evidence:IsA" id "RS" subject "//@evidence.0/@item.4" deﬁnition "//@evidence.0/@
item.14"/ >
< evaluation xsi type "Evidence:MeansThat" id "SVR" subject "//@evidence.1/@item.0" meaning "//@evi
dence.0/@item.18"/ >
< evaluation xsi type "Evidence:IsScopedBy" id "HL SC" subject "//@evidence.0/@item.2"/ >
< item xsi type "Evidence:EvidenceGroup" name "Safety Analysis Artefacts" element "//@evidence.0/@item.1
//@evidence.0/@item.3 //@evidence.0/@item.2"/ >
< item xsi type "Evidence:Document" name "FTA"/ >
< item xsi type "Evidence:Document" id "DOC HL 001" name "Hazard Log" url "" title "System Hazard Log"
citation "System Manufacturer. Hazard Log of the System. 2016" >
< custody xsi type "Evidence:CareOf" custodian "//@evidence.0/@element.0"/ >
< custody xsi type "Evidence:UsingProcess" method "//@evidence.0/@element.1"/ >
< provenance xsi type "Evidence:OwnedBy" owner "//@evidence.0/@element.0" >
< timing xsi type "Evidence:StartTime"/ >
< /provenance >
in OPENCOSS [51] and with the rest of standardization eﬀorts for 
assurance cases. Evidence requirements of speciﬁc safety standards 
and their comparison (as in e.g. [56]) could also be used as basis for 
analysing SACM, and the extent to which SACM models help under
stand assurance information could be studied, similarly to recent 
experiments on safety compliance needs [58]. Finally, and as for other 
OMG standards, further analyses can be performed on SACM in 
relation to, for instance, its ontological foundations (as for BPMN 
[15]) and its complexity (as for UML [16]).
Appendix A. Examples of SACM models
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(a) 
(b) 
I / 
argument 
.§Y.stem Argumentation: 
Argumentation 
argument element 
.§Y.stem Assurance 
Case: Assurance Case 
evidence / ~ evidence 
Software Artefacts: .§Y.stem Evidence: 
Evidence Container Evidence Container 
evidence 
.§Y.stem Component Evidence: 
Evidence Container 
• • argument element 1 Hazards Identified: .§Y.stem Argumentation: '• > Hazard Absence: < •1 Claim Araumentation I Claim assumed: false ! ,~,m,c assumed: false 
toBeSupported: false element toBeSupported: false 
I \ 
target 
target argument element 
HL-HI: Asserted source ......_ I Hazard Log Evidence: I - HL·HA: Asserted 
Evidence - I Information Element I ~ source Counter Evidence 
source t Hazard Mitigation or 
I HL-SRC: Asserted I 
I Evidence I evidence Avoidance: Claim target assumed: false ~ 
argument 
element 
'I element 
' I 
toBeSupoorted: true ~ argument element 
Hazard Log~ \ I 
Safety Reguirements I Document I Passed Reviews: 
Closure: Claim 
assumed: false 
toBeSupported: false 
(c) 
Managfil:_ 
Person 
: Created By 
owner 
Test Case TC1: 
Document 
element 
: Is Part Of 
---:- o=w- ne_d_B __ _ 
provenance 
item 
> 
Claim 
assumed: false 
toBeSupported: true 
Software Verification 
Results: Ob·ect 
definition 
SVR EA: 
EAssertion 
element 
Software Testing Tool: 
Tool 
Fig. 24. SACM model in the form of a UML object diagram: (a) assurance case main structure; (b) argumentation; (c) evidence container for software artefacts. 
< property xsi type "Evidence :HasVersion" version "0. 5" / > 
<propertyxsi type "Evidence : IsBasedOn" source "//@evidence . 0/@item. 6"/> 
< property xsi type " Evidence :HasElectronicSource" id "" source "Spreadsheet" /> 
<property xsi type "Evidence :Completeness" status "incomplete"/> 
< /item> 
< item xsi type 
<itemxsi type 
< item xsi type 
<itemxsi type 
< item xsi type 
"Evidence : Document" name "FMEA" / > 
"Evidence : Document" name "Requirements Specification" /> 
"Evidence: Document" name "Design Specification" /> 
"Evidence: Document" name "Safety Plan"/> 
"Evidence :Exhibit" name "Architecture Model"> 
<property xsi type "Evidence :HasElectronicSource" source "SysML diagram"/> 
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Hazard Log Temr:1late: 
Method 
Safety Assurance 
Manager: Person : Start Time 
Hazard Log Entrv. 
HLE 1 : Exhibit 
method 
: Usin 
custody 
p,~~-, --:-l_s _P-art- Of--~ 
element 
:Com 
custodian 
source 
: Confidence attribute 
timing 
§Y.stem Component: 
ob·ect 
< • HL•HMA: Challen es Safety Plan: Document value: reportedAsFact 
s 
Hazard Mitigation or 
Safety Analysis Artefacts: element 
Evidence Grou 
FTA: 
Document 
Avoidance: Claim 
claim 
assumed: false 
toBeSupoorted: true < 
element 
Architecture Model : : Has Electronic Source 
Document Exhibit 
property 
source: SysML diagram 
Software Verification < subject SVR: 
meaning >I SV: Results: Document Means That EAssertion 
whole >I Hazard H1: : Is Part Of Exhibit Hazard: 
QQject 
property ~ 
property Safety Reguirement • > SafReg 1 : Exhibit 
source 
Reguirements 
definition 
subject > R!l9uiremen1s Specification: < RS: lsA ecification: ob·ect Document 
Fig. 25. SACM model in the form of a UML object diagram: evidence container for system evidence. 
</item> 
< i tern xsi type "Evidence :Exhibit" name "Hazard Hl" / > 
< i tern xsi type "Evidence :Exhibit" name "Hazard Log Entry HLEl" > 
< property xsi type "Evidence : IsPartOf" id "" whole "//@evidence . 0/@i tern . 2" / > 
< /item> 
< i tern xsi type "Evidence :Exhibit" name "Safety Requirement SafReql" > 
< property xsi type "Evidence : IsPartOf" whole " //@evidence . 0/@item. 4" / > 
<propertyxsi type "Evidence : IsBasedOn" source "//@evidence . 0/@item. 8"/> 
< /item> 
<itemxsi 
<itemxsi 
type 
type 
"Evidence :Record" name "Me.eting Minutes"/> 
"Evidence :Object" name "Hazard"/> 
\ I assertion 
I HMA: Referenced I Claim 
Desig.!1..§P.ecification: 
Document 
Meeting Minutes: 
Record 
HLR•EA: 
EAssertion 
definition 
Hazard Log.:. 
ob·ect 
< item xsi type "Evidence :Object" id " " name "Hazard Log" concept "Hazard Log" definition "//@evidence . 0/@ 
item. 16"/> 
<itemxsi 
<itemxsi 
type 
type 
"Evidence :Object" id"" name " Requirements Specification"/> 
"Evidence:Object" name "System Component"/> 
"Evidence : EAssertion" id "HLR EA" content "A hazard log id the document in which all the safety 
management activities, hazards identified, decisions made, and solutions adopted, are recorded or referenced"/> 
< itemxsi type 
< item xsi type "Evidence :ReferencedClaim" id "HMA" content '"' claim " //@argument . 0/@argumentElement . 7" / 
>
< item xsi type "Evidence:EAssertion" id "SV" content "Actions have been taken for system veriﬁcation"/ >
< element xsi type "Evidence:Person" id "" name "Safety Assurance Manager"/ >
< element xsi type "Evidence:Method" name "Hazard Log Template"/ >
< /evidence >
< evidence name "Software Artefacts" >
< item xsi type "Evidence:Document" name "Software Veriﬁcation Results" title "" >
< provenance xsi type "Evidence:OwnedBy" owner "//@evidence.1/@element.0"/ >
< provenance xsi type "Evidence:CreatedBy" source "//@evidence.1/@element.0"/ >
< provenance xsi type "Evidence:PerformedBy" id "" executor "//@evidence.1/@element.1"/ >
< provenance xsi type "Evidence:ApprovedBy" supervisor "//@evidence.1/@element.2"/ >
< /item >
< item xsi type "Evidence:Document" name "Test Case TC1" >
< property xsi type "Evidence:IsPartOf" whole "//@evidence.1/@item.0"/ >
< /item >
< item xsi type "Evidence:Object" name "Software Veriﬁcation Results" deﬁnition "//@evidence.1/@item.3"/ >
Fig. 26. Screenshot of a basic editor for creating SACM models.
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< item xsi type "Evidence:EAssertion" id "SVR EA" content "Software veriﬁcation results indicate the pro
cedures that passed or failed for each software review, analysis, and test, including coverage analyses and
traceability analyses"/ >
< element xsi type "Evidence:Person" name "Veriﬁcation Manager"/ >
< element xsi type "Evidence:Person" name "Tester"/ >
< element xsi type "Evidence:Person" name "Manager"/ >
< element xsi type "Evidence:ProjectObjective" name "Show that a system satisﬁes its requirements"/ >
< element xsi type "Evidence:Tool" name "Software Testing Tool"/ >
< /evidence >
< evidence name "System Component Evidence"/ >
< /SACM:AssuranceCase >
References
[1] OMG, Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM), version 1.1, 〈http://www.
omg.org/spec/SACM/1.1/〉, 2015 (accessed 26.09.16), 2016.
[2] Astah, Astah GSN editor, 〈http://astah.net/editions/gsn〉, 2015 (accessed 26.09.
16), 2016.
[3] OpenCert, 〈https://www.polarsys.org/proposals/opencert〉 (accessed 26.09.16),
2016.
[4] R. Hawkins, I. Habli, T. Kelly, J. McDermid, Assurance cases and prescriptive
software safety certiﬁcation: a comparative study, Saf. Sci. 59 (2013) 55 71.
[5] S. Nair, J.L. de la Vara, M. Sabetzadeh, L. Briand, An extended systematic literature
review on provision of evidence for safety certiﬁcation, Inf. Softw. Technol. 56 (7)
(2014) 689 717.
[6] S. Nair, J.L. de la Vara, M. Sabetzadeh, D. Falessi, Evidence management for
compliance of critical systems with safety standards: a survey on the state of
practice, Inf. Softw. Technol. 60 (2015) 1 15.
[7] JJ.L. de la Vara, M. Borg, K. Wnuk, L. Moonen, An industrial survey of safety
evidence change impact analysis practice, IEEE Trans Softw Eng, in press, 2016,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSE.2016.2553032
[8] R. Alexander, T. Kelly, B. In: Gorry, Safety lifecycle activities for autonomous
systems development, in: Proceedings of the 5th SEAS DTC Technical Conference,
2010.
[9] J.L. In: de la Vara, Current and necessary insights into SACM: an analysis based on
past publications, in: Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on
Requirements Engineering and Law (RELAW 2014), pp. 10 13.
[10] OPENCOSS, D6.2 Detailed Requirements for Evidence Management of the
OPENCOSS Platform, 〈http://www.opencoss-project.eu/node/7〉, 2012 (accessed
26.09.16), 2016.
[11] A. Olivé, Conceptual Modeling of Information Systems, Springer, Heidelberg,
Germany, 2007.
[12] J. Becker, M. Rosemann, C. von Uthmann, Guidelines of business process
modeling, in: W. van der Aalst, J. Desel, A. Oberweis (Eds.), Business Process
Management LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg, 1806, pp. 39 40.
[13] OMG, Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), 〈http://www.bpmn.org/〉
(accessed 26.09.16), 2016.
[14] OMG, Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML), 〈http://uml.org/〉 (accessed 26.09.16),
2016.
[15] J. Recker, Evaluations of Process Modeling Grammars Ontological, Qualitative
and Quantitative Analyses Using the Example of BPMN, Springer, Heidelberg,
Germany, 2011.
[16] K. Siau, Q. Cao, Uniﬁed modeling language: a complexity analysis, J. Database
Manag. 12 (1) (2001) 26 34.
[17] G. Génova, J. Llorens, A. Fraga, Metamodeling generalization and other directed
relationships in UML, Inf. Softw. Technol. 56 (7) (2014) 718 726.
[18] D.J. Rainhardt , J.C. Knight , J. Rowanhill, Current Practices in Constructing and
Evaluating Assurance Cases with Applications to Aviation, NASA Technical Report,
2015.
[19] J.L. de la Vara, A. Ruiz, K. Attwood, H. Espinoza, R.K. Panesar-Walawege, A.
Lopez, I. del Rio, I., T. Kelly, Model-based speciﬁcation of safety compliance needs:
a holistic generic metamodel, Inf. Softw. Technol, 72, 2016, pp. 16 30.
[20] S. Nair, J.L. de la Vara, A. Melzi, G. Tagliaferri, L. de-la-Beaujardiere, F. Belmonte,
Safety evidence traceability: problem analysis and model [- LNCS 8396], in:
C. Salinesi, I. van de Weerd (Eds.), REFSQ, Springer, Heidelberg, 2014, pp.
309 324.
[21] N. Mansourov, D. Campara, System Assurance: Beyond Detecting Vulnerabilities,
Morgan Kaufmann, Burlinton, MA, USA, 2011.
[22] J.L. de la Vara, H. In: Espinoza, Dealing with software model quality in practice:
experience in a research project, in: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop
on Quality and Measurement of Software Model-Driven Developments (QUAMES),
2013, pp. 396 405.
[23] J.L. de la Vara, S. Nair, E. Verhulst, J. Studzizba, P. Pepek, J. Lambourg,
M. Sabetzadeh, M. Towards, A model-based evolutionary chain of evidence for
compliance with safety standards [Workshops LNCS 7613], in: F. Ortmeier,
P. Daniel (Eds.), SAFECOMP, Springer, Heildelberg, 2012, pp. 64 78.
[24] L. Sun, Establishing Conﬁdence in Safety Assessment Evidence, University of York,
York, UK, 2013.
[25] OPENCOSS, D4.1 Baseline for the Common Certiﬁcation Language, 〈http://
www.opencoss-project.eu/node/7〉 (accessed 26.09.16), 2016.
[26] OPENCOSS, D6.1 Baseline for the Evidence Management Needs of the
OPENCOSS platform, 〈http://www.opencoss-project.eu/node/7〉 (accessed 26.09.
16), 2016.
[27] H. Li, J. Wu, C. Yuan, Y. Luo, M. van den Brand, L. In: Engelen, A Systematic
Approach for safety evidence collection in the safety-critical domain, in:
Proceedings of the 9th Annual IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon),
2015, pp. 194 199.
[28] J.B. Goodenough, C.B. Weinstock, A.Z. Klein, Eliminative Argumentation: A Basis
for Arguing System Properties. Software Engineering Institute, Technical Report,
CMU/SEI-2015-TR-005, 2015.
[29] J. Rushby, Understanding and Evaluating Assurance Cases, SRI International,
Technical Report SRI-CSL-15-01, 2015.
[30] R.K. Panesar-Walawege, M. Sabetzadeh, L. Briand, Supporting the veriﬁcation of
compliance to safety standards via model-driven engineering: approach, tool-
support and empirical validation, Inf. Softw. Technol. 55 (5) (2013) 836 864.
[31] Goal Structuring Notation Working Group, GSN Community Standard version 1,
〈http://www.goalstructuringnotation.info/documents/GSN Standard.pdf〉, 2011
(accessed 26.09.16), 2016.
[32] Open Group, Dependability through Assuredness (O-DA) Framework, 2013.
[33] ISO, ISO/IEC 15026-2: Systems and Software Engineering Systems and Software
Assurance Part 2: Assurance case, 2011.
[34] IEC: EN 62741 Guide to the Demonstration of Dependability Requirements
The Dependability Case, 2015.
[35] L. Cyra, J. Górski, SCF a framework supporting achieving and assessing
conformity with standards, Comput. Stand. Interfaces 33 (1) (2011) 80 95.
[36] EN, CENELEC 50129: Railway applications. Communication, Signalling and
Processing Systems. Safety Related Electronic Systems for Signalling, 2003.
[37] DO-178C, RTCA: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certiﬁcation, 2012.
[38] Oxford Dictionaries, Evidence 〈http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/
english/evidence〉 (accessed 26.09.16), 2016.
[39] D. Jackson, M. Thomas, L.I. Millet, Software for Dependable Systems: Suﬃcient
Evidence? The National Academic Press, 2007.
[40] D. Falessi, M. Sabetzadeh, L. Briand, E. Turella, T. Coq, R.K. Panesar-Walawege,
Planning for safety standards compliance: a model-based tool-supported approach,
IEEE Softw. 29 (3) (2012) 64 70.
[41] OPENCOSS, D6.3 Speciﬁcation of the Evidence Management Service
Infrastructure, 〈http://www.opencoss-project.eu/node/7〉 (accessed 26.09.16),
2016.
[42] G. Regan, F. McCaﬀery, K. McDaid, D. Flood, Medical device standards' require-
ments for traceability during the software development lifecycle and implementa-
tion of a traceability assessment model, Comput. Stand. Interfaces 36 (1) (2013)
3 9.
[43] OMG, Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR), 〈http://www.
omg.org/spec/SBVR/1.0/〉 (accessed 26.09.16), 2016.
[44] F. Jouault, I. Kurtev, Transforming Models with ATL [Workshops LNCS 3844],
in: J.-M. Bruel (Ed.)Models, Springer, Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 128 138.
[45] P. Mäder, O. Gotel, Towards automated traceability maintenance, J. Syst. Softw. 85
(10) (2012) 2205 2227.
[46] J.P. Nytun, C.S. Jensen, Modeling and testing legacy data consistency require-
ments, in: P. Stevens, J. Whittle, G. Booch (Eds.), UML 2003 LNCS 2863,
Springer, Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 341 355.
[47] C. Ayora, V. Torres, J.L. de la Vara, V. Pelechano, Variability management in
process families through change patterns, Inf. Softw. Technol. 74 (2016) 86 104.
[48] S. Nair, N. Walkinshaw, T. Kelly, J.L. In: de la Vara, An evidential reasoning
approach for assessing conﬁdence in safety evidence, in: Proceedings of the 26th
IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), 2015,
pp. 541 552.
[49] OMG, System Assurance Task Force Agenda, 〈http://sysa.omg.org〉 (accessed 26.
09.16), 2016.
[50] R.A. Martin, Building a Software Assurance Road-map and Using It Eﬀectively,
〈http://www.asq509.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/92786〉 (accessed 26.09.16),
2016.
[51] OPENCOSS, D4.4 Common Certiﬁcation Language: Conceptual Model, 〈http://
www.opencoss-project.eu/node/7〉 (accessed 26.09.16), 2016.
[52] B.V. Selic, On the semantic foundations of standard UML 2.0, formal methods for
the design of real-time systems, in: M. Bernardo, F. Corradini (Eds.), SFM-RT 2004
19
systems: a comparison study, Comput. Stand. Interfaces 36 (6) (2014) 889 898.
[57] Eclipse Modeling Framework, 〈https://eclipse.org/modeling/emf/〉 (accessed 26.
09.16), 2016.
[58] J.L. de la Vara, B. Marín, G. Giachetti, C. Ayora, Do models improve the
understanding of safety compliance needs? Insights from a pilot experiment, in:
10th ACM/IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and
Measurement (ESEM 2016), pp. 32:1 32:6.
LNCS 3185, Springer, Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 181 199.
J.M.E. Morales-Trujillo, H. Oktaba, M. Piattini, The making of an OMG standard, 
Comput. Stand. Interfaces 42 (2015) 84 94.
K.C. Wohlin, P. Runeson, M. Höst, M.C. Ohlsson, B. Regnell, Experimentation in 
Software Engineering, 2nd ed., Springer, Heidelberg, 2012.
L.OMG, Dependability Assurance Framework for Safety-Sensitive Consumer Devices 
(DAF), 〈http://www.omg.org/hot-topics/cdss.htm〉 (accessed 26.09.16), 2016.
M.W. Youn, B.J. Yi, Software and hardware certiﬁcation of safety-critical avionic 
20
